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Germany is the second important coffee market in the world, just overshadowed by 
the United States. Coffee is the most famous beverage in Germany – even more 
popular than beer. On the supply side dominate few roasters. Market structure 
influences the market outcome and explains the processors’ ability to exercise 
market power. This paper aims at studying the pricing behavior in the German 
market for roasted coffee. Respectively, it discusses the impact of three different 
explanations. First, market power may be due to low price elasticity related to a 
high level of consumption. Second, pricing behavior may be influenced by the 
industry concentration. And finally, pricing behavior may be change over time due 
to exogenous shocks. In particular, the degree of competition has changed as a 
consequences of a merger. Further, cyclical demand changes induce pricing 
behavior. Empirical results are derived using data on the aggregate market for 
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  The dark side of coffee.   




Germany is the second largest coffee market in the world. With a share of 9.3% of 
total green coffee consumption, it is only overshadowed by the United States with 
a share of 21.6% (DKV 2001). Within Germany, coffee is the most popular beverage, 
in fact more popular than beer. Per capita consumption of green coffee in 2000  
was 6.7 kg (corresponding to 162.4 liter of brewed coffee). In contrast, ‘only’ 127.5 
liters of beer were consumed in the same year (GFK 2000). However, coffee is a 
stagnating market with negative rates of growth and fierce price competition. The 
average growth rate of nominal sales for the period 1995 to 2000 in Germany is –
2.5% while the average growth rate of consumption is -1.6%. In 1996 F.O. LICHT’S 
observed that “[t]he Germany coffee market, unlike the United States, is 
characterized by fierce competition at processors, wholesale trade and grocery 
level”. The degree of competition was expected to increase even further in 1997 as 
a result of a merger of two German coffee roasters (Tschibo and Eduscho). Market 
observes at the time of the merger expected substantial changes in firms’ pricing 
behavior: “[the merger] could lead to devasting competition among roasters who 
could be inclined to cut prices for the sake of mere survival” (METHA 1997). 
 
This paper examines the pricing behavior in the German market for roasted coffee. 
Additionally, it analyses whether the degree of competition has changed due to 
two exogenous shocks. After analyzing the impact of the merger, emphasis will be 
given to cyclical demand changes in pricing behavior. Cyclical consumption pattern 
occurs every year before Easter and Christmas. Given that these pieces of 
information are common knowledge, suppliers could implement it in their 
optimization and may adjust their pricing behavior.  
 
In the formal model, we follow BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN  (2000) and consider an 
aggregate model of oligopolistic interaction. The industry is made up of an 
exogenously determined number of firms producing a homogenous good. 
Competition is measured by the elasticity of conjectural variation. A simultaneous 
equation system of a demand and a supply equation explains the market outcome. 
Following APPELBAUM (1982) marginal costs are inferred from evolution of input 
prices. Roasters use the main input factors in fixed proportions, and economies of 
scale are limited. Therefore a linear marginal cost function is chosen. Non-linearity 
in parameters requires the generalized method of moments as estimation 
technique.  28.01.2002     2 
 
The analysis differs from previous work in two ways: It is the first to apply a 
simultaneous equation framework for the aggregate German market for roasted 
coffee. Before, a similar analysis has only been made for the Netherlands 
(BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN 1997 and 2000). Second, focus lies on the question whether 
suppliers of roasted coffee change their pricing behavior due to exogenous shocks. 
 
The outline is as followed. The next section gives an overview of the German 
coffee market. Section 3 discusses the theoretical model of market demand and 
market supply. Demand is estimated as a function of prices (coffee and other 
beverages), income, and time. The supply function is derived from profit 
maximization under oligopoly competition. Section 4 describes the data and the 
empirical model. Estimation results follow in section 5. The estimated coefficients 
should give evidence for two questions: Whether and in which extent could 
suppliers determine prices for roasted coffee? And do they adjust their pricing 
behavior over time? Concluding remarks contain the last section 6. 
 
2. The German market for roasted coffee. 
In Germany coffee is the most popular beverage, in fact more popular than beer. 
Per capita consumption of green coffee in 2000 was 6.7 kg (corresponding to 162.4 
liters of brewed coffee). In contrast, ‘only’ 127.5 liters of beer were consumed in 
the same year (GFK 2000). But since 1994 coffee demand has shown characteristics 




The supply side is composed of only a few companies offering roasted coffee. In 
1999 the five biggest companies in the roasted coffee market have been Jacobs 
with a market share of 27% (measured by turnover), the merged company 
Tchibo/Eduscho with 24%, Melitta with 13.5% and Aldi with 12% as well as Dallmayr 
with 8% (LIENING 2000). These companies have a combined market share of 84.5%. In 
1997 KOERNER observed “weak consumption despite fierce competition”. This leads 
to the (first) question whether the demand and supply characteristics trigger   
exercising market power. 
                                         
1   The government invents through the levying of the coffee tax and of the value added tax. The 
excise tax is 4.30 German Marks per kilogram of roasted coffee. The value added tax on food 
counts for 7%. 
2   Till 1992 there has been a tax of 1.80 German marks per pound on green coffee and the tax of 
2.15 German marks per pound on roasted coffee. Because of the harmonization due to the 
European Single Market the indirect taxation has been abolished. But the member states have 
intervented for the right to raise national taxes. Germany keeps the tax on roasted coffee 
(FEUERSTEIN 1996b). 28.01.2002     3 
 
At the beginning of 1997 the two German roasters Tchibo and Eduscho officially 
merged.
3 At that time Tchibo was the second largest roaster and Eduscho the 
number three. METHA (1997) observed “uncertainty and fierce competition” in the 
German coffee market. In order to investigate the pricing behavior, the impact of 
the merger on pricing strategy is the (second) question.  
 
Over the year, the coffee purchases are significantly higher before Easter and 
Christmas compared to other months. This consumption plan could be seen as 
cyclical demand fluctuations. MCDONALD (2000) described falling prices for seasonal 
food products due to demand peaks: Seasonal demand increases reduce 
information costs and costs of informative advertising. These price declines are 
linked to market concentration and strengthened by several rivals - instead of only 
one brand (MCDONALD  2000). PARKER (1997) argued that demand fluctuations are 
fluctuations in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Considering goods for 
which the timing of purchases is possible (e.g. stock holding) demand-driven rise in 
sales induce relatively low real price increases. Firms smooth prices over time. 
 
ROTEMBERG/SALONER (1986) found evidence for a increasing degree of competition in 
periods of raising demand. Firms have an incentive to cheat on a collusive 
agreement because the most profitable strategy is to attract consumers via 
granting price reductions. Similar results obtained HALTIWANGER/HARRINGTON (1991) 
and FABRA (2001). Collusive behavior varies according to cyclical demand 
fluctuations and capacity constraints. In contrast, SPENCE (1977) identified the level 
of excess capacity and the degree of collusion to be negatively related. Collusive 
prices tending to move procyclically.  
 
Based on the observation of cyclical demand fluctuations over the year the (third) 
question is whether these fluctuations cause systematically changes in pricing 
behavior. Competition changes could be detected by systematic increases or 
decreases in prices.  
  
                                         
3   In April 1997 the BUNDESKARTELLAMT (German Antitrust Authority) gave the permission for this 
merger. 28.01.2002     4 
3. Theoretical model and specification. 
Following BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) a simultaneous model of demand and supply 
of roasted coffee is recommend. Because of aggregate data roasted coffee is 
assumed to be a homogenous good. Demand is specified as a linear demand curve 
homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. Consumption of roasted coffee is 
determined by the retail price of roasted coffee, the net income of households, 
prices of other goods (complementary and substitute) (KUTTY 2000). The demand 





t t t t p a p a y a p a a Q 4 3 2 1 0 + + + + =  
with  t Q as consumed quantity of roasted coffee,  i a  as parameters to be estimated, 
t p  as price for roasted coffee,  t y  is the net income of households, 
c
t p  denotes the 
retail price of a complementary good (soda water) and 
s
t p  the retail price of a 
substitute good (caffeine-containing soft drinks, tea or soluble coffee). The index t 
( T t ... 1 = ) denotes the time. 
Suppliers are assumed to maximize profits by choosing quantity as strategic 
variable.
4 The profit π  of firm i ( n i ... 1 = ) at time t can be written as 
(2a)  () ( ) t it i it it t it w Q C Q Q p , − = π  
with  it Q  as quantity sold by firm i,  i C  as cost function of firm i depending on the 
quantity sold ( it Q ) and a vector of input prices  t w . Since 1993 the roasters have to 
pay a specific tax on roasted coffee. The tax is symbolized by  c τ  while the value 
added tax is given by  vat τ . The equation (2a) can be modified to 
(2b)  () ( ) it c t it i it it t
vat






Solving the maximizing problem subject to the individual quantity  it Q  it follows 
that 
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= η .  θ  is the conjectural elasticity of total output 
with respect to the output of the ith firm. η  symbolizes the price elasticity of 
demand for roasted coffee. For a market model the individual supply functions 
                                         
4    The resulting model contains the possibility of imperfect competition as well as perfect 
competition by the value of the elasticity of conjectural variation. 28.01.2002     5 
have to be aggregated to a market supply function. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that the cost function has the GORMAN-Polar form (GORMAN 1953, BLACKORBY et al. 
1978). This function stresses individual costs functions to be quasi-homothetic 
which implies that at the optimum marginal costs are equal over all firms.
5 But the 
use of such a function type with aggregate data alludes to a severe assumption 
(HOLLOWAY/HERTEL 1996): The mark-up term is restricted to be identical across 
firms. With respect to firm behavior the parameter of conjectural variation is 
assumed to be identical across all firms (MCCORRISTON/MORGAN/RAYNER 2001). 
 
 





a1 = η , and used in the equation (3). This yields the relevant supply function for 
firm i: 
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1
. 
Data in prices, tax rates as well as the consumption quantity can be obtained. The 
parameters  θ  and a1 can be derived directly following APPELBAUM (1982). The 
estimated parameter θ  gives evidence for the price setting hypothesis. The period 
analysed contains two ‘events’ (merger and cyclical demand fluctuations) which 
may have caused changes in the pricing behavior. To test for the impact of 
structural breaks the period is sampled into two subperiods (before and after the 
event). If behavior changes the conjectural variation can be explained as follows: 











The dummy variable takes the value Zero before the event and is set equal to One 
in the period after the event. Using (5) in the supply equation (4) tests whether 
firm’s behavior significantly changes. The related equation is given by (4’) 
(4’)     () () c vat t
it
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5   Additionally this form allows different firm to have different cost curves but the curves are all 
linear and parallel (APPELBAUM 1982). 28.01.2002     6 
4. Data and estimation specifications.  
The empirical analysis is based on monthly data for the German roasted coffee 
market over the period 1992:1 to 2000:12. The main data sources are the GERMAN 
FEDERAL  STATISTICAL  OFFICE and the INTERNATIONAL  COFFEE  ORGANIZATION (ICO). Since 
Germany does not grow coffee itself and all stocks are on a quite low level, 
consumption is measured as imports less re-exports (green bean equivalent). Data 




Retail prices and total expenditure per capita are taken from the GERMAN FEDERAL 
STATISTICAL OFFICE and computed as real values. FEUERSTEIN (1996a) argues that no 
good is a good substitute for roasted coffee whilst for example KUTTY (2000) and 
BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) see tea as close substitute. Though four different 
beverages are used alternatively: black tea, soluble coffee, soft drinks containing 
caffeine (for simplicity called ‘coke’) and soda water. While ‘coke’ has a significant 
influence on the demand for roasted coffee, all other beverages yields insignificant 
results. 
Knowledge about the production process helps to model marginal costs. The 
roasting of coffee itself is quite simple (see e.g. SUTTON 1991) including coffee 
beans, roasting and grinding as well as packaging. All input factors are used in fixed 
proportions, the possibility of economies of scale is quite limited 
(BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN 2000).
7 Like APPELBAUM (1982) marginal costs are infered 
indirectly from evolution of input prices.
  
The main input factor is the raw material, the coffee bean. Measured as a fraction 
of the total production value the costs of coffee beans count for a share of 67% on 
average while other input factors take a cost share less than 5%. Because the world 
market prices of green coffee beans is quoted in US-cents and the retail price in 
                                         
6   Because of the standardized measure (green bean equivalents) it is not possible to distinguish 
between green, roasted and soluble coffee. While for the production of one kilogram of roasted 
coffee 1.19 kilogram of green coffee is needed the fabrication of one kilogram of soluble coffee 
requires 2.6 kilogram of green coffee (DKV 1997). Such technological requirements make it 
necessary to use a unified measure. 
7   The production process of roasted coffee uses a mixture of different varieties. A company wants 
to offer continously a special taste. To stick to the same taste the possibilities of substitution 
between bean varieties are limited.
7 That means, a cost function for beans with limited 
possibilities of substitution may describe the process in a more realistic way (like a COBB-DOUGLAS 
production function). KARP/PERLOFF (1993) argue that Arabicas and Robustas of different 
countries are imperfect substitutes. Marginal costs must be written as linear function of input 
factors with possibilities of substitution between beans (multiplicative in beans). Estimation 
results show evidence that the linear formula fits better to the data. 28.01.2002     7 
Germany is in German Marks the analysis has to take into account fluctuations in 
the exchange rate.  
The relevant marginal cost function includes the prices of green coffee beans of 
three different varieties  i w  (in US-cents) and the exchange rate of Dollar versus 
German Marks. As an additional input factor the model contains the costs for labor 
which is computed as wage per employee (monthly average). The price index of 
freight considers the costs of distribution within Germany while the oversea 
transportation costs are included in the green bean prices: Quotations for the 
variety  Other Milds 
mild w  are for prompt shipment to Bremen/Hamburg, for 
Colombian Excelso 
colom w  for prompt shipment to several major coffee markets 
including Bremen/Hamburg, and Robustas 
rob w  for prompt shipment to LeHavre/ 
Marseilles. 






t it freight sts co labour rate exchange w w w MC + + + + + =  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics in the sample. 
Variable Mean  standard 
deviation 
Consumption in mln. bags à 60 kg.  0.8314  0.1778 
Real retail price of roasted coffee, in German marks per 500g.  8.4397  0.7604 
Real household expenditure in bn. German marks.  1.9702  0.1590 
Price index of soft drinks containing caffeine (1 liter)  1.0031  0.0223 
Real world market price of Other Milds Bremen/Hamburg, in US-Dollar 
per pound.  1.2736 0.4360 
Real world market price of Colombian Excelso, in US-Dollar per pound.  1.2031  0.4357 
Real world market price of Robustas LeHavre/Marseilles, in US-Dollar 
per pound. 
0.8424 0.3352 
Real Exchange rate US-Dollar/German Marks  0.9830  0.0906 
Monthly wages per employee in 1.000 German Marks  5.1144  0.6196 
Price index of freight rate  1.6780  0.1643 
 
Using (6) the estimation model for the basic model is given as: 
(1)  
c
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The demand equation encloses a time component. While GLANIA (1997) describes a 
consumption pattern without seasonal variations, BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) find 
Dutch coffee demand lowest in the first quarter and highest in the fourth quarter 28.01.2002     8 
of a year. This analysis tests different models of consumption varying over time. 
The best fit is yield with a quite smooth increasing trend over the year.  
 
Furthermore, the hypothesis of changes in suppliers’ pricing behavior due to 
exogenous shocks is tested. The relevant model is given by the demand equation 
(1) and the supply function (4’): 
(1)  
c
t t t t t p time y p Q 4 3 2 1 0 α α α α α + + + + =  
(4’)    
[ ]
601 . 4 *
07 . 1
1 1
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 *
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+ + + + + + =
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12 : 1996 1 : 1992 0
12 : 2000 1 : 1997 1
to
to
dummy  for  the  merger model 
 
Non-linearity in the parameters of the estimation equations (4) and (4’) requires 
the GMM estimation procedure (see HANSEN/SINGLETON 1982). The instruments for 
the system estimation are the different input prices and the exchange rate, price 
(index) of another consumption good and the expenditure of households as well as 
the consumer price index. 
 
Three different specifications are estimated. First the so-called “basic model” 
without any dummy variables. The estimation should give information about the 
behavior of the firms in the market over the whole period. The second estimation 
specifically considers the consequences of the merger (“merger model“). The third 
model specification analyses the impact of cyclical demand fluctuations related to 
the holidays Easter and Christmas (“holiday model”).  
 
                                         
8   Because the supply side contains a certain time structure the demand equation must be tested 
whether there is a similar time structure or not. To care for the consumption scheme the 
demand equation considers the holidays as well by including the dummy variable as additional 
regressor:  dummy p time y p Q
c
t t t t t 5 4 3 2 1 0 β α α α α α + + + + + = . 28.01.2002     9 
5. Estimation results. 
 
The three specifications are estimated: the basic model, the holiday model 
concerning cyclical demand fluctuations and the merger model considering the 
merger of Tchibo and Eduscho in 1997. Estimation technique is the GMM. The 
estimation results of the structural models are shown in the following table 2.
9 
 
Table 2 Estimation results (t-values in brackets). 
  Basic model  Holiday model  Merger model 
Constant  7.8656*** 3.2825*** 7.4758*** 
  (5.4868) (3.2024) (5.3698) 
Retail Price  -0.1481***  -0.0294***  -0.0655*** 
  (-5.6135) (-2.5621) (-4.4811) 
Trend 0.0468***  0.0225**  0.0440*** 
  (3.8843) (2.3617) (3.8605) 
Income -0.0187***  -0.0074*  -0.0151*** 
  (-4.1545) (-1.8822) (-3.2318) 
Retail Price ‘Coke’  -3.0729***  -0.9296  -3.3919*** 
  (-3.2144)  (-1.3961)  (-3.6004) 









   (1.2330)  
Constant 7.9254***  11.0384***  7.2432*** 
  (4.3407) (2.0687) (4.3491) 
Other Milds  2.8710***  3.6154**  2.8357*** 
  (4.6092) (2.0458) (5.1558) 
Colombian Excelso  -2.7613***  -3.5592*  -2.9081*** 
  (-4.4984) (-1.8722) (-5.3000) 
Robustas 0.7127***  0.7530**  1.0528** 
  (3.2700) (2.0156) (4.4054) 
Wage per employee  -0.1223  -0.5362  -1.0119* 
  (-0.3024)  (-0.8023) (-1.6566) 
Exchange Rate  -0.0131  0.0942  0.0163 
  (-0.1876) (0.4821) (0.2552) 
Price Index Freight  0.0234  1.0192  1.2278 
  (0.0350) (0.9483) (1.3227) 
Conjectural Variation   -0.4869***  -0.5111*  -0.3324** 
  (-2.7856)  (-1.7863)  (-2.3768) 
Holiday Dummy  --  0.1278  -- 
    (1.3356)  
Merger Dummy  --  --  0.0865** 

















Iterations 18  10  16 
* denotes a significance level of 10%. ** a significance level of 5%,  *** a significance level of 1%. 
                                         
9   The equation (1) and (4) as well as (1) and (4’), respectively, are estimated, not the reduced 
forms. 28.01.2002     10 
 
The estimated parameters of the retail price is negative and significantly different 
from Zero. The average own price elasticity counts for –1.5034 in the basic model, 
-0.5969 in the holiday model and –1.3298 in the merger model. The average income 
elasticity is derived as –3.6198, as –1.4324 and as –2.9230, respectively. The 
magnitude and especially the sign of this elasticity seems surprising. Nevertheless 
one possible explanation for this finding may be that the analysis uses aggregated 
data. Though it might be possible that with increasing income households change 
consumption towards less quantity and more quality. Soft drinks with caffeine have 
a negative sign that indicates that they are complements to roasted coffee.
10 
Except for the holiday model the price of ‘coke’ induces significant changes in 
roasted coffee consumption. 
 
The estimated signs of the three different coffee varieties indicate that Other 
Milds and Robustas influence the retail price positively while a price increase in 
the  Colombian Excelso variety reduces the retail price. This relationship is 
unexpected and may suggest that this variety is less important in the German 
market. Costs due to changes in the exchange rate as well as labor and freight 
costs do not significantly influence the consumer price for roasted coffee. 
 
All estimated parameters for the conjectural variation deviate significantly from 
Zero. This favors the hypothesis that roasters exercise market power. In the basic 
model the coefficient is  4869 . 0 = φ . As well the parameter differs significantly from 
One (t-value of -2.9354) which stresses that the companies do not act as uniform 
cartel (monopoly).  
 
The significance of the dummy variables gives evidence whether exogenous shocks 
have an effect on pricing behavior. The estimated coefficient of the dummy 
variable does not differ significantly form Zero. Hence, months without a holiday 
have the same elasticity of conjectural variation as months with a holiday 
( 5111 . 0
1 0 = θ = θ ). The annual consumption scheme does not induce structural 
adjustments in suppliers’ prices. The ‘peaceful times of the year’ - Christmas and 
Easter – do not stimulate variations in the intensity of competition. This gives 
evidence for Parker (1997) who found that price responses to fluctuations in 
demand are minor for goods for which the timing of purchase is important. 
 
                                         
10   The estimated sign of the soft drinks is unexpected. And even more confusing are the results for 
the other goods that have been tested. All goods reveal a negative sign, that is, all goods are 
complements to roasted coffee even black tee and soluble coffee. This relationship must be an 
aspect of further research. 28.01.2002     11 
According to the merger the number of suppliers is lower affecting the market 
outcome. The dummy variable coefficient has the opposite sign of the conjectural 
variation and deviates significantly from Zero. The difference in pricing behavior 
before and after the merger is significant. Before the merger the conjectural 
variation was  3324 . 0 0 = θ , after the merger  2459 . 0 1 = θ . Hence the impact of the 
merger is a increasing degree of competition. Additionally, it could be concluded 
that the merger has induced a price war (close to BERTRAND-behavior), as expected 
by market observers. The empirical analysis designate that the lower number of 
suppliers changes the processors’ behavior towards price competition. The degree 
of competition is intensified. The consumers benefit from diminishing prices 
related to a kind of “price war”. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
This analysis examines the pricing behavior of coffee roasters in Germany for the 
period 1990: to 2000:12. The market for roasted coffee is characterized by 
oligopoly power. The suppliers of roasted coffee have influence on the retail price 
and they use their price setting potential to employ price competition. The 
estimated elasticity of conjectural variation deviates significantly from Zero. The 
pricing behavior varies over time due to exogenous influences. The exogenous 
influences are the merger of two coffee roasters and retailers TCHIBO and EDUSCHO in 
1997 and the cyclical fluctuations in consumption (before Christmas and Easter). 
While the merger has intensified the price competition, the consumption scheme 
does not affect the firms’ behavior.  
 
Several restrictions had to be imposed. It is assumed, that the good ‘roasted 
coffee’ is homogenous, that the individual supply functions can be aggregated to 
one market supply function, and that adjustments to new equilibria are 
instantaneous. In reality, these assumptions are generally violated. Further 
research on differentiated duopoly should help to analyze pricing strategies on the 
firm-level data. In this context it would be possible to model BERTRAND-behavior 
directly with price as strategic variable and with heterogeneous products 
(FEUERSTEIN 2001, MCMANUS 2001, VICKNER/DAVIES 2000). Within such a framework the 
impact of the merger on rivals’ pricing behavior could be tested straightforwardly. 
Future research should be done in the field of long-run and short-run effects and 
the persistence of commodity price responses (see e.g. CASHIN/LIANG/MCDERMOTT 
2000 and GÓMEZ/CASTILLO 2001).  
 
 
 28.01.2002     12 
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